

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

LEONARD L. WILSON,	)	CASE NO. 5:10 CV 2508
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
	)	
v.	)	
	)	<u>MEMORANDUM OF OPINION</u>
CITY OF AKRON, et al.,	)	<u>AND ORDER</u>
	)	
Defendants.	)	

On November 3, 2010, plaintiff *pro se* Leonard L. Wilson filed this *in forma pauperis* action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Akron and the Akron Police Department. The complaint alleges plaintiff was “unlawfully detained and held in custody by defendant on a false warrant...” Complaint, p.2. It is further alleged defendants did not take plaintiff to court for a hearing on contempt of court charges.

Although *pro se* pleadings are liberally construed, *Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable

basis in law or fact.<sup>1</sup> *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Lawler v. Marshall*, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); *Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville*, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. *Id.* A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." *Id.* Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement. *Id.* It must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Id.* A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. *Id.* The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. *Id.* Where a

---

<sup>1</sup> A claim may be dismissed *sua sponte*, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the Court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. *McGore v. Wigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); *Spruytte v. Walters*, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); *Harris v. Johnson*, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); *Brooks v. Seiter*, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" *Id.*

Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting plaintiff might have a valid claim. *See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.*, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief). Respondeat superior is simply not a proper basis for liability under § 1983. *Leary v. Daeschner*, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003); *Bellamy v. Bradley*, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 156, 83 L.Ed.2d 93 (1984). Governmental entities may be deemed liable for the unconstitutional actions of their agents only when those actions are the result of official policies or customs. *Monell v. Dept. of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Accordingly, the request to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted and this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 2/14/2011

/s/ John R. Adams  
JOHN R. ADAMS  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE